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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

JACQUELINE RICCIUTI,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8070

JACK C. ROBINSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts is incomplete. The
jury could have believed that the following was the
factual situation under which the accident occurred:
1. A girl's head in the driver's lap (R. 8, 41, 51, 67).
2. Speed in excess of 60 miles per hour (see below
and argument under Point II) .
.3. Darkness (R. 7).
4. Light snow falling (R. 7, 38, 80).
5. Wet road (R. 20 and appellant's brief p. 3).
6. Residential area (appellant's brief p. 5).
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7. Four A. M. (R. 8, 33) after having been up all
night (R. 76 to 80).
8. Driver smoking a cigarette while driving under
above circumstances (R. 8, 41, 67, 83 and appellant's brief p. 3, 8, 9, 24).
Appellant's attorn ey may choose to believe the defendant when he said the girl's head was not in his lap.
But the jury could have believed not only the plaintiff,
but also the t\vo disinterested police officers who all
agreed that at the ti1ne of the accident and thereafter
the defendant unequivocally repeated that the girl's
head \Yas in his lap, and the accident occurred ·when he
dropped the cigarette in his lap or on her hair and was
afraid it would ignite the girl's hair (R. 8, 41, 51, 76).
1

Testimony by Sergeant Bennett that the car was
traveling n1ore than 60 miles per hour was properly
before the jury. This is discussed in connection with
the argu1nent under Point II.
As further evidence fro1n which the jury was justified in believing that defendant's speed was much greater
than the 35 to 40 1niles per hour he claimed to be traveling (R. 83) in the 30 1nile per hour speed zone (R. 74)
the record contains the follo\ving:
After the rar left the road the right rear fender
\vas crushed on a tree and the rear bumper was hooked
on the tree and t\visted backward and torn off its
fastenings 011 thP right side (R. 35, 48, 66). Then the
car \Vent -over a five inch high curb with such momentum
that the underside of the rar gouged out a large piece
of turf before thP ~prings could raise the car up to
thP UP\\' level (R. 35, 36, 47, 71). In going over the
2
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san1e five inch curb, the rear wheels left the ground and
did not come do,vn for a distance of 20 feet forward
(R. 36, 48, 49, 72, 73, 74). While the rear end of the car
was in the air the right rear door and hinge pillar post
,vere torn off the car by hitting another tree (R. 36, 48,
G6).
Furthermore the car traveled approximately 192
feet on the parking and an additional 183 feet after it
returned to the road (R. 37, 38) before it could be
brought to a stop (R. 85, 86).

ARG Uj\IIENT
POINT I. rrHE QUESTION OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE JURY.
THE IjAW OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT
The abstract definition of wilful misconduct quoted
from Stack v. Kearns, 221 P. 2d 594 (Utah, 1950) at the
upper part of page 10 of appellant's brief is certainly
correct. Ho,vever, appellant's attempted application
thereof is not in accordance with the decisions.
The precise question before this court is not simply
"\vhether defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct. It is
rather:
Do the facts so clearly show the absence of wilful
1nisconduct that reasonable 1ninds cannot differ
in so concluding.
Exa1nination of a large number of wilful misconduct
cases will show that where the surrounding facts indicate
a culpable disregard of circumstances which should have
made defendant apprehensive of danger previous to the
emergency which culminated in the accident, the courts
3
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hold that reasonable n1inds can differ as to whether such
disregard amounted to wilful misconduct and the rnRP
should go to the jury.
On the other hand where the facts show only lTIOlnentary inattention or an act of mere carel'essness or poor
judgment, then the courts hold that there could not be
w·ilful Inisconduct as a n1atter of law.
The following cases 'vill illustrate the above statement of the la,v. They are not intended to be exhaustive,
but they are representative.
ILLUSTRATIVE~ CASES HOLDING WILFUL

11ISCONDUCT FOR .JUR.Y
Continued excessive speed on na1To'v road 'vith
da1np shoulders around curve after previous near
n1ishap and requ'ests to slo'v do,vn. Also jury could
have believed that 'vas 1naking trick high speed
turns. Stack v. Kearns, 221 ]>. 2d 594 (Utah,
1950).
Driver fell asleep at wheel before accident and
then fell asleep hours later at time of accident.
Esernia 'L'. Overland Moving Co., 206 P. 2d 621
(Utah, 1949). Fron1 dissenting opinion by Judge
Wad e. Case decided on other grounds.
Atte1npting to drive around kno'vn dangerous
curve at 55 1niles per hour in rain with windshield
wiper not 'vorking, 'vithout di1ninishing speed.
Car swa vin {)' fron1 side to side. Previous skidding
and req~ests to slo"r do,vn. Norton r. Puter, 32
I>. 2d 172 ( Oal., 193+).
Driving 40 to 50 1niles per hour at night on one of
principal streets of Denver with one hand, and
with right ar1n around girl co1npanion, gre'eting
rf\p0nted warnings 'vith indifference and laughter,
4
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and kissing girl just before collision. Schlesing~r
v. Miller, 52 P. 2d 402 (Colo., 1935). Statute IS
worded "wilful and wanton disregard of rights
of others."
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES HOLDING NO WILFUL
MISCONDUCT
The cases cited by appellant are used for this section
since they are presu1nably the Inost favorable to him.
Momentarily took eyes off road to pick up dropp'ed cigarette while driving 50 to 60 1niles per
hour 100 feet fro1n bridge. No prior misconduct.
Neyens v. Gehl, 15 N. W. 2d 888 (Iowa, 1944).
Driving at high but not excessive speed. Accident
occurred when attention momentarily distracted
from driving by presence of b ee in car and on
wrist. Rindge v. Holbrook, 149 A. 231 (Conn.,
1930).
Driving at 45 to 55 miles per hour at 2 A.M. and
withdrawing attention from road while turning
radio dial attached to steering post for period of
time. Lost control of car trying to avoid slow
moving car on road ahead. Did not notice car
ahead until within 50 feet of it. Bashor v. Bashor,
85 P. 2d 732 (Colo., 1938). (Strong dissenting
opinion.)
Attempting to defrost windshield on lighted highway at night by placing palm of hand on it while
traveling about 40 miles per hour. Accident occurred when did not see slow moving truck ahead
until within 15 feet of it. Rowe v. Vander K olk,
270 N. W. 788 (Mich., 1936).
APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
As pointed out in respondent's statement of facts
above, there was tes~imony prop·erly before the jury
1

5
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from which it could have believed the following to he the
factual situation in this case:
In spite of having been up all night, with visibility
limited by snow and darkness, and on a wet residential
street, defendant drove at more than 60 1n.p.h. while he
smoked a cigarette and rested a girls' head in his la )J.
This certainly ainounts to a culpable disregard of
circumstances which should have 1nade defendant apprehensive of danger previous to the e1nergency which culminated in the accident, so that the question of wilful
1nisconduct was properly for the jury.

POINT II. SERGEANT BENNETT'S OPINION
AS TO SPEED WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
This clailned error is summarized on page 18 of
appellant's brief as follows:
"In view of the fact that th~e officer did not
possess the qualifications necessary to 1nake this
opinion and the further fact that the circumstances under which this accident happened can
i;n no way be related to any accepted study of
speeds in relation to brake marks, road surfaces
and reaction time, it must therefore be concluded
that a proper foundation was not laid for the
opinion and it was error to admit it."
It is submitted that the. following adequately qualifies Sergeant Bennett:
I-Ie had been 'vith the city trtlffic department for
practically 12 years before he investigated this accident
(R. 43), had investigated a great many accidents (R. 51},
and was thoroughly fan1iliar with the concepts of reaction tilne, coefficients of friction for different types
6
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of pave1nent and under different weather conditions, and
the use of the approved chart to determine stopping
distances at various sp'eeds and road conditions. See
particularly pages 43 to 46 of the record where Mr.
Hanson cross examined him on these matters. Also note
1\t[r. Hanson's statement (R. 45) :
"1-Iowever, you have had extensive experience
in this sort of 'vork, and you 1nay be able to help
us a little bit on that."
On the question of whether the particular circumstance:-; of this case are such that the accept'ed study of
the relationship between speed and stopping distances
under various road conditions cannot be used, the record
sho\\'H the following:
The car traveled approximately 373 feet from the
time it l~ft the highway to the ti1ne it stopped. Of this
distance the first approximately 190 or 192 feet were on
the parking, and the remaining approximately 183 feet
(174 or 175 plus 9) were back on the highway (R. 37,
38).
Appellant's contention appears to be that the conditions are not susceptible of an expert opinion as to
speed because part of the distance traveled was on the
'vet grass parking, hitting trees, and bouncing over
driveways. However, this does not prevent ascertaining
fro1n accepted speed and braking distance studies the
speed of the car after it return'ed to the road.
The following testimony (R. 52) refers only to the
183 feet the car traveled after it left the parking and
return ed to the street.
1

7
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"BY MR. HOROWITZ:
Q. I would like to ask just one question. Re-

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

ferring to the chart that you have there, at
what speed under those conditions would a
car have to be traveling in to take 183 fe1et to
stop1
MR. HANSON: You 1nean the condition of
the street.
The conditions of the street at the tiine.
183 feet.
183 fe-et.
The nearest I can get to that is 187. Wait a
Ininute. 185, at 65 percent coeficient of friction is exactly 60 miles per hour.
60 miles per hour. Thank you very much.
rrha t is actual braking distance.
That is the figure I \vant."

Th e reason braking distance is the proper figure
is because reaction time was taken up while the car was
on the parking.
1

As a proper foundation the following testimony is
in the record: The car was in good mechanical condition
(R. 84). The defendant applied the brakes as soon as
he felt the car going onto the parking (R. 85 ). He
wasn't sure his foot was on the brak'e all the while he
was ·bouncing around on the parking, but the car stopped
bouncing wh en it got back on the road (R. 85, 86). This
\Vas under a road condition of wet high-type asphalt
which has a coefficient of friction of 65 per cent (R. 45,
52).
1

It is difficult to see how appellant can claim that one
isolated part of Sergeant Bennett's testimony can be
8
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prejudicial 'error when the record also contains this
other testimony by Sergeant Bennett not objected to at
the trial or claimed to be error on appeal, concluding
fro1n the accepted chart that the vehicl e was traveling
approximately 60 miles per hour after it left the parking
and returned to the road, so that the speed must have
be·en in excess of 60 miles per hour when the car first
left the road.
1

POINT III.
CORRECT.

THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE

In Instruction No. 5 the jury was instructed that a
host is not obligated to his guest to exercise ordinary
care, but his only obligation to such guest is to refrain
fro1n 'vilful misconduct.
In Instruction No. 6 the jury was plainly and correctly instructed as to the elem:ents of wilful misconduct.
This instruction is based on the case of Stack v. Kearns,
221 P. 2d 594 (Utah, 1950), which appellant quotes from
at page 10 of his brief as containing a correct definition
of 'vilful misconduct.
The judge reiterat'ed in Instructions Nos. 7 and 8
that if the jury found the defendant was negligent, or
even if he intentionally did something that was wrongful, still a case of wilful misconduct would not be established unl ess his conduct was characterized by the
ele1nents of wilfulness previously mentioned (in Instruction No. 6).
1

Appellant's argument that the instructions were
erroneous does not take issue with any of the above
instructions, but seems to be centered on Instruction No.
9
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16 which contains definitions of negligence and ordinary
care. With respect th'ereto he declares that:
"By instructing the jury on the lPgal dPfinition applicable to the negligent acts of one guilt~,.
of a tort, the court entirely ignored the concept
of \Vilful 1nisconduct, and ther'ehy delimited anrl
foreclosed in the 1nindR of the jury th~ nece~sary
legal ele1nents of the case." (p. 21, 22)
This contention fron1 appellant's brief is not justified
as is shown by the abov'e state1nents concerning Instructions Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8.
A.t page 22 of his brief, appellant quietly ad1nits
that there 'vere other instructions that "alluded to'' the
doctrine of \vilful 1nisconduct. But then he goes on to
say that it isn't necessary to consider wlrether those other
instructions \Vere correct because "this court has long
held the vie"r that instructions which are contradictory
or conflicting are prejudicially erroneous if they effect
.
."
' . 1 Issue.
a rna t,er1a
1\..n exan1ination of Instruction No. 16 will show
whether or not it contradicts the other instructions and
makes negligence rather than .wilful misconduct the test
of liability. Instruction No. 16 begins \vith the following
state1nent:

"In order to assist you in determining this casre,
the follo\ving definitions and explanations are
given:"
The rest of Instruction No. 16 contains definitions and
explanations of burden of proof, preponderance of evidence, proxilnat'e cause, negligence and ordinary care.
The 'vords "wilful 1nisconduct" \vere inserted to indicate

10
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that it as well as negligence is not an absolute term,
but depends upon the surrounding circurnstances. No·where does this instruction state any test of liability.
It ~iinply contains definitions and explanations of various legal terrns and concepts used in other parts of the
instructions.
Appellant S eems to assume that because this is a
\vilful 1nisconduct case the mere presence of the negligence and ordinary care definitions and explanations
1nake~ the instructions contradictory.
However, the
fallacy of this assumption is readily shown by a consideration of Instructions Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 referred to
above. In those instructions the jury is plainly informed
that negligence and lack of ordinary care cannot constitute -vvilful misconduct. The words "negligence" and
''ordinary care" are legal terms with a particular meaning in the la-vv. Since the jury had been instructed that
neither negligence nor lack of ordinary care would be
sufficient to find for the plaintiff, it was only proper
that they b e instructed as to the legal meaning of those
terrns. And of course the appropriate place for this is
in an instruction such as No. 16 which is an omnibus
instruction defining various legal terms.
1

1

Since the instructions are not contradictory, the
cases cited by appellant are not in point and need no
refutation.
The instructions to the jury contained a correct
definition of wilful misconduct and application thereof
to the facts of this case, and were clear and not
contradictory.
11
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CONCLUSION
In the present case the judgment should be affirmed.
The question of wilful misconduct was rightly before
tlre jury and was duly determined by it. There was no
prejudicial error to overcome the presumption of correctness of the lower court's judgment, or require the
plaintiff to undergo the expense and ordeal of a new
trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Jerome Horowitz,

Attorney for Respondent

12
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